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ABSTRACT
A more explicit, comprehensive and sustained dialogue between the African 
philosophical and Western feminist traditions would yield insights at once rich 
and useful to both traditions, and beyond, e.g. to the African feminist tradition. 
Here, I place the work of Belgian philosopher Luce Irigaray in discussion with 
Ghanaian Kwame Nkrumah’s conception of “consciencism”. What they most 
saliently share is an understanding of how the dichotomies central to traditional 
Western philosophy (mind-body and idealism-materialism) have been key in the 
structural exclusion and oppression of the “others” of this dominant tradition. 
Both are convinced that Western metaphysics serve ideological purposes and 
help to perpetuate relations of domination. Both struggle with the question 
of how to effectively resist this specific violence of the Western philosophical 
tradition without repeating its logic. Most importantly for the current analysis, in 
their search for sources for resistance and emancipation, Nkrumah and Irigaray 
do not remain with diagnoses; instead both assume or construct a fluid ontology 
outside of, or beyond, this dominant symbolic order.
 ● “Water is the fundamental substance” (Thales of Miletus, 600BCE).
 ● “The endurance of the world consists in process; and activity, or process, 
becomes the life-blood of reality” (Nkrumah 1964: 25).
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 ● “You could never come across a language without the rupture of space, an 
aerial or aquatic language in which, moreover, alterity would be lost more surely 
than ever” (Derrida 1981: 112-3).
 ● “[F]orm [is] no more than an apparent and temporary stability in the patterns of 
potentiality or flow” (Battersby 1998: 51).
 ● “[The] sacrificial economy of solids depends upon a forgetting of those elements 
that do not have the same density” (Irigaray 1999: 2).
 ● “[A] fluid economy creates the possibility of a community capable of recognising, 
rather than excluding, difference” (Caldwell 2002: 25).
INTRODUCTION
There have been sporadic attempts to foster a dialogue between predominantly 
Western feminist and African theoretical positions, early on by Harding (1987) and 
lately also by Metz (2013).1 In her comparative work, Harding criticises both so-
called “difference feminists” such as Gilligan (1982) as well as African “difference” 
theorists for committing essentialist fallacies in their respective attempts to 
valorise (particular conceptions of) “femininity” and “Africanness” over against 
“masculinity” and “Europeanness”. She claims that such arguments tend to lose sight 
of the extent to which the alleged differences or dichotomies have been the historical 
outcome or result of systems of domination and exploitation. Metz’s project, on 
the other hand, has been to critically compare “Western feminist care ethics” and 
“Afro-communitarian ethics”, concluding that “an African ideal of community, 
when understood in a philosophically refined way, provides an important, relational 
corrective to the [feminist] ethic of care” (Metz 2013: 77).
While both these articles have obvious merits, it is clear from the literature that 
the debate so far has mostly been narrowly focused on ethical considerations. In 
what follows, I take the debate between feminist and African philosophy into the 
more fundamental domains of metaphysics and ontology. This, however, does not 
mean that the normative dimension disappears completely; in fact, it is assumed 
that ethics, politics and ontology are tightly interwoven, and that a thorough critique 
of the dominant paradigm should include an ontological dimension. In particular, I 
take seriously the claims to difference from the dominant Western paradigm, which 
come from these two streams of thought, as long as they avoid falling into the trap 
of essentialism. In response to Harding’s first concern, I aim to show through my 
comparison of Nkrumah and Irigaray how the essentialist pitfall can be avoided 
while taking the claim to difference seriously. 
1 See Metz (2013: 77) for a list of other authors who have alluded to these apparent commonalities, 
including Tronto (1987) from the side of care ethics and Mangena (2009) from the sub-Saharan 
tradition. 
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Harding’s second major concern about comparisons between Western feminist 
care ethics and African communitarian ethics, namely that the reason that they are 
both different from mainstream ethics and similar to each other is because they 
both emerge from similar structures of oppressive power relations, is also a central 
aspect of my approach here. Strengthened by the critical analysis of another feminist 
author, Kroeger-Mappes (1994), Harding’s suspicion that care ethics and African 
ethics may effectively constitute “slave moralities” in response to the same excesses 
of the same (white, patriarchal) master, represents potentially the most devastating 
critique of care and African communitarian ethics. The power relations underlying 
lived differences should thus be squarely acknowledged – as is also emphasised by 
African feminist authors such as Tamale (2008: 48) and Mangena (2009: 18). This 
insight remains crucial, whether one’s focus is on ethical or ontological differences, 
so let us consider it more closely.
Speaking only to Western feminist care ethics, Kroeger-Mappes (1994) 
emphasises the unequal power relations upon which the gendered dichotomy 
between a (masculinised) ethics of rights and a (feminised) ethics of care is 
erected and which this dichotomy serves to sustain. She asserts categorically that 
these ethical systems are not as Gilligan’s early work may have implied, “separate 
but equal” (see Gilligan 1982, in Kemp & Squires 1997: 151-2 and for her later 
corrections on this point, see Gilligan 2014).2 Instead, these two “ethics” in actuality 
form two sides or dimensions of the same system in which the dictates of care 
ethics (placing obligations and duties of care on women that would remain strictly 
supererogatory for men) facilitate the privileged existence of a masculinised world 
of self-interested subjects limiting themselves to a self-centred, non-relational ethics 
of rights (see particularly Kroeger-Mappes 1994: 113-114). A devalued care ethics 
and “women’s work” are the necessary (material as well as symbolic) prerequisites 
for the existence of “autonomous” adult (male) agents who are neither obliged to 
give care nor need ever acknowledge the extent to which the material maintenance 
of their lives depends upon the care work of others. These authors imply that naively 
emphasising these apparently straightforward “sex differences” and attempting to 
valorise the neglected feminine side of the equation could amount to a conservative 
gender politics, and I agree with them.3 This critical analysis could plausibly be 
2 Gilligan (1982) speaks for instance of  “two disparate modes of experience that are in the end 
connected… both perspectives converge…[in a] dialogue between fairness and care [that] provides 
a better understanding of relations between the sexes [and]…gives rise to a more comprehensive 
portrayal of adult work and family relationships” (in Kemp and Squires 1997: 152).
3 While it is true that dangerous, dirty and hard work is often relegated to men of lower social 
standing, the gender division of labour means that in most societies, traditionally, women have 
been assigned the care work, irrespective of what else they should do. Also characteristic of 
feminised care work is that it has carried and still carries associations of low social status and in 
fact is almost always non-paid. In contrast, even the low status and hard work of men are as a rule 
paid work. 
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extended to colonial and racist divisions of labour where the excess value produced 
by undervalued and unacknowledged work of the “natives” facilitates the possibility 
of self-centred, non-relational and uncaring lives for “settlers”.
However, where I part ways with these analyses, is in that Harding and Kroeger-
Mappes seem to me to run the risk of reducing the claim to difference to nothing 
more than a symptom of existing distorted power relations. Though I take on board 
their caution concerning constitutive power relations, it is my contention in this 
paper that relations of domination do not account for all onto-political claims to 
difference, and that a thorough engagement of especially the European feminist 
tradition, with African philosophers, focused on questions of ontology, epistemology 
and metaphysics, is likely to show this idea more clearly than if we were to limit 
the discussion to the normative sphere. In particular, I find the work of Irigaray 
illuminating in that it helps to show how similar questions and issues are at stake in 
African and in feminist thinking, and how they may be used to critique and enrich 
each other. My analysis should show that by placing in a constructive dialogue the 
work of two specific thinkers working within these two (counter- or marginalised) 
traditions, the gains of a critical dialogue between these traditions will emerge more 
clearly. I first focus on Nkrumah’s work in Consciencism, and then turn to Irigaray 
to draw links between their key ideas. In a final section, I refine and set out some 
of the results of this constructed dialogue, with a particular concern regarding the 
implications for the African feminist tradition. 
NKRUMAH
In Consciencism (1964) Nkrumah constructs a dialectical materialism in line with 
the Marxist tradition (and the work of authors such as Friedrich Engels and Georgi 
Plekhanov). His idea, for which he coins the neologism “consciencism”, however 
differs from the Marxist tradition in that he claims his understanding of dialectical 
materialism to be in line with traditional or pre-colonial African (i.e. non-Western) 
metaphysics. He thus squarely falls into the category of what Harding would call 
“African difference” thinkers. The term “consciencism”, suggesting simultaneously 
“conscience”, “consciousness” and “science”, does not, however, derive its name 
from its alleged link with the pre-colonial past, but rather from a certain anticipated 
future. Nkrumah sees this ontology or description of reality as the necessary 
philosophical frame or “consciousness”, the necessary contemporary “African 
conscience”, or African worldview, to accompany the praxis of colonial liberation 
and of both material and symbolic decolonisation. Consciencism is his way of 
beginning to resolve what he sees as the “crisis of African conscience” of his time, 
caused by colonisation (Poe 2005: 195). 
I contend that it is for these reasons impossible to do justice to this concept 
as it features in Nkrumah’s (1964) work without acknowledging that, like most 
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“postcolonial” writing, it is self-consciously historical, and embedded in a transitional 
landscape. It is thus heuristic and strategic and particularly for this reason does not 
need to fall into the trap of a simplistic essentialism.4 Moreover, “consciencism” is 
posited as playing a key role within this transitional process, as it were anchoring the 
possibility of an alternative future (and of emancipatory action) in an enabling picture 
(myth, even) of a more humane African past. In this regard, of course, Nkrumah stands 
in the tradition of Marx and Engels who are not interested in merely philosophically 
interpreting the world, but especially, in changing the world (Marx’s famous 1845 
Eleventh thesis on Feuerbach). Nkrumah, as an author writing during the process of 
African liberation, is acutely aware of the practical import of philosophical ideas, 
and of the need for solid theory to guide processes of decolonisation.
Nkrumah (1964) highlights with this book the necessity of not only challenging 
the ethics and politics of Western global domination, but also to delve deeper into the 
Western worldview which has facilitated or undergirded the large-scale exploitation 
of “others” and “non-Westerners”, especially during Western “modernity”. The 
main question that underlies Nkrumah’s work in Consciencism is one shared by 
many twentieth century European philosophers, such as Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer in their Dialektik der Aufklärung (first published in German in 
1944). These echoes point to an intertwinement of contemporary concerns, which 
is one of the main reasons why I find a dialogue between the European and African 
philosophical traditions to be potentially particularly fruitful. The Europeans’ most 
immediate concern in 1944 is the internal state of Europe at the time - the European 
crisis associated with fascism and the two world wars. 
Thus they, like Nkrumah, urgently search for the roots of totalitarianism in 
Western thinking, tracing them as far back as Odysseus (“Excursus I” 1997: 43ff) 
and the ancient Greek concept of “Enlightenment” which they believe has haunted 
Western self-understanding since its beginnings (Horkheimer & Adorno 1997: 3). For 
Horkheimer and Adorno, the answer to their question thus lies in the early Western 
conception of reason as a force of domination over nature, including over the natural 
aspects of the self, over supposedly “more natural others” such as women and slaves, 
and over nature as such. The promise of control was conflated with the promise 
4 There are clearly aspects of Nkrumah’s thought that may correctly give rise to the charge of 
essentialism. For example, his notion of the “African personality” which is viewed as “an essential 
characteristic of the African nation” (Nkrumah 1964: 79; Poe 2005: 196) shared by all African 
peoples in a timeless manner, does entail such an essentialist concept. My non-essentialist 
reading of consciencism is, however, not completely unwarranted, I would say, because of 
Nkrumah’s acknowledgement of its heuristic and strategic importance (cf. for example Nkrumah 
1964: 62-3). I suppose it is a charitable reading in this context to claim that Nkrumah did not 
necessarily believe in (or did not strictly speaking need to believe in) the veracity of his broad and 
largely unsubstantiated claims about the continuation of pre-Socratic, pre-colonial African and 
contemporary scientific views, supposedly underlying his notion of consciencism, as explained in 
the chapter “Consciencism” (Nkrumah 1964: 78-106).
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of emancipation and enlightenment (Horkheimer & Adorno 1997: 4). Rationality 
understood as domination of the natural world for them reached its devastating peak 
in Western modernity, finally exploding during the twentieth century in places like 
Auschwitz and Nagasaki.5 It is important to note that these Enlightenment critics 
make a historical or genetic argument, showing how and why Enlightenment 
conceptions of rationality have been overly narrow and instrumentalist, leading to 
totalitarianism, oppression and alienation. They are thus not essentialist and do not 
see Western philosophy as inherently corrupt; instead, they show the contingency 
or non-necessity of the rule of instrumental reason within this tradition. The neo-
Marxists of the Frankfurt School – including Adorno and Horkheimer, but also 
Marcuse, Habermas and others – were thus among the key role players ushering 
in the major self-critique of Western philosophy of the late twentieth century and 
beyond.
Nkrumah’s answer to the same question can be viewed as following similar 
lines,6 but he focuses on the mind-body, meaning-matter or idealism-materialism 
hierarchical dichotomy strongly associated with Descartes and Plato, and of course 
his focus was on the devastation the West wrought on the African continent. The 
Nkrumah of Consciencism posits this dichotomy as being not only central to Western 
metaphysics, but also an important key to Western global domination and the 
colonisation of Africa. He claims that this dichotomy “favours or inspires” oligarchy, 
hierarchy and inequality (Nkrumah 1964: 75), first of all within Western society, 
but also extending beyond. It thereby functions to maintain and legitimise unequal 
social relations; “power over”, as Hannah Arendt would put it (Arendt 1970: 36; 
discussed in Bernstein 2013: 80-85). The basic hierarchy which is established in 
Greek antiquity between the supernatural (associated with abstract reason) and the 
natural (the sensible world), Nkrumah claims, tends to get translated on a social level 
into a class-stratified society.
For Nkrumah, supernatural explanations of nature − i.e. any positing of a superior 
“outside” to, and/or opposite of, the natural and material world − simultaneously 
require and justify a class-stratified society. Since in an idealist world nature cannot 
be explained by nature − to which everyone typically has equal access via the senses 
– supernatural explanations are almost per definition elitist and require some form of 
initiated priesthood. This for him inevitably gives rise to a jealously guarded priestly 
class of higher human beings associated with the supernatural realm and its wisdom. 
He believes that the ancient Greeks had social-moral preoccupations which they 
expressed in metaphysical terms (Nkrumah 1964: 36). The most obvious example 
here would be Plato (pp.41ff), who constructed an extended metaphysics with a 
hierarchical binary set up between the visible and the “real” world, in order to frame 
5 For a recent study of the role of philosophical thinking in facilitating the Shoah, see Segev’s (2013) 
Thinking and killing: Philosophical discourse in the shadow of the Third Reich, De Gruyter, 2013.
6 Space limitation prohibits a fuller comparison between Nkrumah and Adorno. 
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and justify his ideal hierarchical republic, presided over by the class of philosopher-
kings. 
It sometimes seems as if Nkrumah postulates a dichotomy between idealism 
and materialism, and that he wants to simply cancel out the former by erasing the 
supernatural realm altogether. He postulates a harmful otherworldliness as necessary 
for the maintenance of social hierarchy, and he believes that by annihilating that type 
of ontology, and replacing it with a purely immanent, material world, he can further 
the political pursuit of equality. Such a position seems inherent in the following 
excerpt (Nkrumah 1964: 75):
I explained how idealism was connected with a tiered society, how through its mode of 
explaining nature and social phenomena by reference to spirit, idealism favoured a class 
structure of a horizontal sort, in which one class sat upon the neck of another. I also explained 
there how materialism, on the other hand, was connected with a humanist organization, how 
through its being monistic, and its referring all natural processes to matter and its laws, it 
inspired an egalitarian organization of society. The unity and fundamental identity of nature 
suggests the unity and fundamental identity of man in society. Idealism favours an oligarchy, 
materialism favours an egalitarianism.
It seems then as if Nkrumah wants to dissolve the most basic hierarchical binary 
between the supernatural and natural worlds by abolishing the supernatural superior 
pole for the sake of pure immanence, which would directly support (African, and 
human) liberation.7 Finding that the worldviews of some traditional African societies 
and of the pre-Socratic philosophers including Thales, Heraclitus and Anaxagoras 
resonate with some central insights of contemporary scientific theories, Nkrumah 
postulates a dialectic materialist understanding of the world in line with these 
thinkers, where nature, mind/spirit, as well as society are all explained purely 
immanently. Nature is primary, and the cause of everything.
This is also why Thales becomes one of the heroes of his book. Nkrumah sees 
Thales’ naturalistic explanation of the material world as “dispensing with the gods 
altogether as sources of explanation of natural or social phenomena” (Nkrumah 
1964: 32). The origin or source of the material world no longer lies outside of or 
beyond it in an opposing, but superior, domain. Thales’ idea that “everything is 
water” implies for Nkrumah in the first place that no supernatural explanations for 
the world are needed, since the material world contains its immanent cause within 
itself. Secondly, it importantly suggests that “everything [is] derived from one and 
the same substance”. And so he concludes, that Thales’ thinking implies on a social, 
political level:
…the fundamental identity of man as well, man according to him being not half natural, half-
supernatural, but wholly natural. That is to say, on the social plane, his [single] metaphysical 
7 Nkrumah (1964: 78) states in this regard: “The emancipation of the African continent is the 
emancipation of man.”
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principle underlying all of reality amounted to an assertion of the fundamental equality and 
brotherhood of men. (Nkrumah 1964: 34) 
For Nkrumah then, a pervasive strategy for shoring up arbitrary social hierarchies in 
the history of the West lies in its supernatural accounts of the world and the sacerdotal 
powers that they facilitate. And thus, when philosophy and science offer fully natural 
explanations of the world, they undermine this kind of power and could serve as 
instruments of social justice (Nkrumah 1964: 36). The postulation of the Judeo-
Christian supernatural realm and of privileged access to it - via the sacred texts and 
literacy - of course lay at the heart of the rationalisation of the European “civilising 
mission” entailing the subjugation and exploitation of the whole African continent. 
While the spread of Christianity functioned as a kind of excuse for invading Africa, 
its inherent metaphysics and hierarchical views of the visible and invisible worlds 
on Nkrumah’s interpretation surreptitiously supported the resulting unequal power 
relations between coloniser and colonised. And Nkrumah (1964) explicitly warns 
that “in present-day Africa” it is necessary to vigilantly and explicitly recognise this 
ideological strategy - this “dialectical opposition” - “for it helps us to anticipate 
colonialist and imperialist devices for furthering exploitation by diverting our 
energies from secular concerns”. He sees the coloniser’s otherworldly religion as an 
obstacle to true African liberation (even if it can be instrumental in the short term) 
and concludes that “it is essential to emphasize in the historical condition of Africa 
that the state must be secular” (Nkrumah 1964: 13).
Yet, an apparently straightforward choice for materialism over idealism becomes 
refined when Nkrumah starts to describe the kind of materialism which he considers 
to be indigenous to Africa. The picture which emerges turns out to be more subtle and 
intricate with the introduction of his understanding of matter as incorporating some 
aspects of what is usually associated with the supernatural. What Nkrumah shows, 
is that the dismantling of the hierarchical dichotomy that Plato installs between the 
visible and the invisible, does not necessarily entail an erasure of the distinction 
between the two, neither the collapsing of one into the other. In contrast, it is the 
strict opposition, the incommensurability, between mind and matter which idealism 
introduced in the West, that Nkrumah views as a kind of “perversion” of thinking 
largely absent from traditional Africa – from “many African societies” (Nkrumah 
1964: 13). Although he does not mention it, the difference between written and 
oral cultures might have played a significant role in the origin of this difference 
between Africa and the West, with the power of the written word (logocentrism) 
which became associated in the West with supernatural, idealised and abstract power 
and consequently with force and domination. In her novel, Nehanda, Zimbabwean 
novelist Yvonne Vera places the following sentiments in the mouth of tribesman 
Ibwe, who responds to his first encounter with a white man and the latter’s attitude 
to the written word:
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Our people know the power of words. It is because of this that they desire to have words 
continuously spoken and kept alive. We do not believe that words can become independent 
of the speech that bore them, of the humans who controlled and gave birth to them. Can 
words exchanged today on this clearing surrounded by waving grass become like a child 
left to be brought up by strangers?8 Words surrendered to the stranger, like the abandoned 
child, will become alien – a stranger to our tongues. The paper is the stranger’s own peculiar 
custom. Among ourselves, speech is not like rock. Words cannot be taken from the people 
who create them. People are their words. (Vera 2007: 33-4)
Based on this reading, one could say that written culture is the West’s peculiar form of 
superstition: investing the written word with supernatural powers – think of the holy 
texts, the legal texts and contracts, the great literary classics. In contrast, in traditional, 
oral African societies, Nkrumah claims that “the visible world was [fully] continuous 
with the invisible world” so that there was no “dialectical contradiction between 
“inside” and “outside” [between immanent and transcendent – Du Toit (2008)] as 
we find in Western idealism”. For traditional Africans, “heaven was not outside the 
world but inside it” (Nkrumah 1964: 13). Not only that, but “man”, too, even though 
viewed as fully material, “is regarded in Africa as primarily a spiritual being, a being 
endowed originally with a certain inward dignity, integrity and value” (Nkrumah 
1964: 68). This is the “non-atheistic”, materialist humanism which Nkrumah sees 
as deeply ingrained in African communities and world-views. I interpret his notion 
of “non-atheistic” to mean that this worldview does not give up on notions such as 
the invisible, the spiritual, or the transcendent, but at the same time it nevertheless 
does not postulate a fully separate abstract realm superior to and in opposition with 
the “natural”, material world in which we live. The supernatural is not seen as the 
superior or outside (transcendent) origin of the natural world. Instead, the spiritual 
elements of life are fully incarnated, which means that all of life is spiritual while 
being fully material. The world is thus fully immanent and material, but carrying a 
spiritual dimension within the material itself. While Western metaphysics thus tends 
with its sharply hierarchical binaries to desacralise the sensible, lived reality, to suck 
out all value, intrinsic worth and finally all life of that part of reality that it designates 
as “nature” (along with certain classes or groups of humans deemed “natural”), 
reducing it to raw material to be exploited, the African materialism of Nkrumah sees 
all existence as teeming with “a plenum of [life] forces in tension, capable of self-
motion” (Poe 2005: 196), and thus as imbued with spiritual value.
For Nkrumah, then, the notion of the human being as “primarily a spiritual being” 
should therefore also not be seen in opposition to, or in stark demarcation from, 
“material being”; rather, the spirituality is an aspect or manifestation of the material 
being. Whereas idealism asserts that matter is inert and cannot exist independently 
8 In Phaedrus Plato famously struggles with the same question of the relative value of writing to 
thinking and live discussion, also comparing a written text to an orphan who is abused in the 
absence of its parents (274c-276a). 
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of spirit (a non-material force animating, moving, and inhering in matter) (Nkrumah 
1964: 82), materialism as a minimum, Nkrumah claims, asserts “the independent 
existence of matter” (ibid: 15), independent of knowledge by mind (ibid: 20). 
Nkrumah uses the notion of “categorical conversion” to explain the emergence of 
self-consciousness from that which is not self-conscious; of mind from matter, of 
quality from quantity (ibid: 20), of a higher logical type from a lower (ibid: 89-
90). He does not assert the sole existence of matter, but rather its “primary reality” 
(ibid: 21). By this he means that other categories of material being – such as what 
Westerners might call “spirit” or “mind” – are “able to arise from matter through 
process”, and thus matter and spirit are on a continuum, even if distinguishable as 
different types or configurations of matter. In his recognition that at a certain level 
of complexity in material arrangement we encounter something fundamentally 
different from matter in its simplest forms, Nkrumah enters what he designates as “a 
dialectical materialism” (Nkrumah 1964: 21): “Dialectical materialism recognizes 
differences between mind and brain, between qualities and quantities, between 
energy and mass; yet, it ‘does not allow the differences to become fundamental and 
irreducible’ ” (ibid: 23). The differences are real differences, yet not metaphysical in 
nature. He explains (Nkrumah: 23):
[O]ne may admit epistemological differences between mind and brain, quality and quantity, 
energy and mass, without accepting any metaphysical differences between them, without, in 
other words, admitting that for mind one needs any more than a brain in a certain condition; 
for quality any more than a certain disposition of quantity; for energy any more than mass 
in a certain critical state. From the standpoint of metaphysics, philosophical materialism 
accepts mind or conscience only as a derivative of matter. Although mind is derived from 
matter, we should not underestimate the difference or gap between the two. 
Nkrumah (1964: 26) preserves the alterity of mind vis-à-vis brain, for example, by 
arguing:
…[t]his kind of emergence, since it depends on a critical organization of matter, truly 
represents a leap. When a crisis results in an advance, it is in its nature to perpetrate a leap...
In dialectical evolution, progress is not linear; it is, so to say, from one plane to another. It is 
through a leap from one plane to another that new kinds are produced and the emergence of 
mind from matter attained.
The dialectic nature of Nkrumah’s materialism therefore leads to a dynamic and 
never stable view of the world. Instead of viewing the world as comprised of states, 
he sees it as comprised of processes – recall the quote at the beginning of the paper: 
“The endurance of the world consists in process; and activity, or process, becomes 
the life-blood of reality” (Nkrumah 1964: 25). 
With the metaphor of life-blood our attention is drawn to the essential fluidity 
that characterises Nkrumah’s dialectical materialist understanding of the world, 
underpinned by an inherently dynamic, changing, moving, multiple, living and 
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streaming understanding of matter. “The acceptance of the vitality of matter – often 
called, pejoratively, ‘animism’ – was prevalent in traditional African societies”, 
explains Poe (2005: 196). This explanation also accounts for Nkrumah’s reading of 
why Thales could on the one hand banish the gods from his naturalistic perspective 
as an explanatory or originating principle, while on the other hand still proclaim 
that “things are full of gods” – representing maybe something like an incarnated 
or pantheistic view. Nkrumah sees this claim as “asserting the capacity of matter 
for spontaneous self-motion”, i.e. to reject its supposed lifelessness or inertness 
(Nkrumah 1964: 83). His position thus entails a radical revaluation of matter as both 
primary and complex, dynamic and alive with forces. Thus it is not only Thales’ 
favourite element, water, which speaks metaphorically to Nkrumah’s ontology, but 
also Herakleitos’ chosen element, namely fire, which Nkrumah (1964: 37) describes 
thus: 
…[f]ire, the fundamental thing, suffers transformation into other things. There is a permanent 
potential of instability in everything, and it is this instability which makes transformations 
possible. Objects are only deceptively serene, they are all delicate balances of opposing 
forces.
Matter’s capacity for self-motion is tied in Nkrumah’s thinking to the existence of 
multiple and opposing forces inhering within, or rather, existing as an integral aspect 
of material nature. Thus “matter is not just dead weight, but alive with forces in 
tension”, which becomes for Nkrumah a hallmark of African, as opposed to Western, 
thinking:
…for the African, everything that exists, exists as a complex of forces in tension. In holding 
force in tension to be essential to whatever exists, he is, like Thales...endowing matter with 
an original power of self-motion...endowing it with what matter would need to initiate 
qualitative and substantial changes. (Nkrumah 1964: 89)
On a social plane, the material notions of “a complex of forces in tension” and constant 
transformation strongly suggest respect for plurality, diversity, multiplicity and the 
dynamic change inherent in all of nature. Thus, in so far as Nkrumah’s thinking 
does still betray essentialist (thus static) tendencies (e.g. his talk of “the African”) 
and attempts at stabilisation and unification such as in “the African personality”, he 
has arguably not properly thought through the full, radical implications of his own 
dynamic ontology. By comparing his work with Irigaray’s similar interrogations, the 
strength of such a fluid position for opposing Western metaphysics and hierarchies 
becomes even clearer.
IRIGARAY
The first striking resemblance between the work of Nkrumah and Irigaray is that they 
are both difference thinkers. One could say that Irigaray is a difference thinker in at 
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least the following two ways: (i) First, like Nkrumah, she refers to, or constructs, 
a possible outside or beyond of the currently dominant Western symbolic order.9 
They both actively explore alternative ontologies. Yet, through her more tentative 
or playful approach, Irigaray more successfully avoids the traps of essentialism 
than Nkrumah does.10 (ii) Secondly, Irigaray’s difference thinking strongly echoes 
that of Nkrumah in that she also emphasises fluidity, alterity and change as inherent 
characteristics of the different socio-symbolic order that she proposes. But I would 
say, since she is more alert to the extent to which the dominant symbolic order 
oppresses precisely through the strategy of the erasure of material difference, her 
vision of a non-sacrificial order poses important challenges to the remnants of 
identity thinking in Nkrumah’s philosophy. On the other hand, the post-colonial 
context infusing Nkrumah’s formulation of a philosophy of difference with a certain 
emancipatory urgency, in its turn poses far-reaching questions to Irigaray’s thinking. 
In contrast with Nkrumah, Irigaray does not make any confident claims about 
the historical or otherwise existence of the alternative symbolic orders that she 
favours. Instead, in her meticulous and suspicious (psychoanalytically inspired, 
against the grain) readings of some classical Western texts and authors, she shows 
how, what she later terms the sacrificial symbolic order (Irigaray 1993a: 75ff) of 
Western metaphysics, again and again sacrifices the material world (gendered 
feminine) in order to establish, found or reinforce an immaterial world (gendered 
masculine) which should reign over the former world. For example, in Speculum 
de l’autre femme11 in an essay called “Plato’s Hystera” (Irigaray 1985a: 241-364), 
she reads the cave myth as a kind of origin myth of the sacrificial symbolic order of 
Western metaphysics. By showing in this text the elaborate procedure necessary to 
first postulate the material world (starting from the visible, the concrete) and then 
to gradually erase its reality and truth in favour of the abstract, she implies that this 
is a specific cultural or symbolic strategy and thus contingent. Here she agrees with 
Nkrumah’s claim that these constructs are Western idiosyncrasies or customs, and 
thus neither necessary nor universal. She does not, however, base the contingency 
claim on knowledge claims about the actual existence of alternative worldviews; but 
9 Irigaray stands out as a theorist who dares to imagine alternatives to the dominant philosophical 
tradition. Braidotti says of her: “There is a visionary, utopian, and at times even prophetic quality 
in Irigaray’s writing, which expresses her faith in the force of the feminine as a new symbolic and 
discursive economy” (Braidotti 1994: 130).
10 Not everyone would agree that Irigaray successfully avoids essentialist thinking. Braidotti is 
one of few theorists who do, saying: “The ontological claim for sexual difference is what makes 
Irigaray so important theoretically and politically; the essentialist belief in ontological difference is 
a political strategy aimed at stating the specificity of female subjectivity, sexuality, and experience 
while also denouncing the logic of sexual indifferentiation of phallogocentric discourse” (Braidotti 
1994: 131). 
11 This text was first published in French in 1974, ten years after Nkrumah’s Consciencism. The first 
English version of Speculum of the other woman appeared only in 1985, published by Cornell 
University Press. 
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rather on showing how some of the founding myths of the West are actively erasing 
competing worldviews. 
In her reading the cave is representative of the womb, and thus of the maternal 
body (Irigaray 1985a: 243). This material-maternal origin must in the Platonic 
ontology be left behind, overcome, transcended, and finally denied and erased as 
unreal. This happens through the tiresome, counter-intuitive journey undertaken 
by the philosopher in the direction of the pure Forms (understood as abstract, 
disembodied and other-worldly Ideas). For Irigaray, as for Nkrumah, the philosophical 
and political orders of the West can be distinguished, but never completely separated 
from each other (cf. Whitford 1991: 101). And therefore, the erasure of the feminine 
cave (female difference and embodiment) from Plato’s metaphysics (even while 
he remains dependent on it to establish the absolute alterity and superiority of the 
supernatural realm), is inseparable from the political exclusion of actual women 
from the polis. 
Where Irigaray thus differs markedly from Nkrumah, is that for her, this strict 
separation of orders was from the beginning dependent on a certain symbolic 
arrangement of sexual meanings into a hierarchical dichotomy. Where Nkrumah 
foregrounds the formation of different social classes, Irigaray focuses on the 
formation of two different sex classes. For her, the devaluation and final erasure 
of the material world can thus not be fully appreciated without an understanding 
of how this devaluation depended upon the devaluation of the feminine and 
female within the symbolic and their erasure within the political domain (Whitford 
1991: 101). Implicitly agreeing with the likes of Horkheimer, Adorno and Nkrumah, 
that the causes of the specific ailments of the Western world should be sought in 
its metaphysical foundations, Irigaray nevertheless differs from them in that she 
identifies at the heart of the founding logic of the West the crime of matricide: the 
murder of the mother and the covering up of the deed.
Although Irigaray detects this strategy of meaning-making in the founding 
strategies of Western metaphysics, its effects and implications did not remain 
limited to a founding moment but are still travelling with us, in particular within 
the Western philosophical tradition. An author like Battersby (1998: 79) shows how 
the masculine Western philosopher from Plato to Kant and beyond sets himself 
up in heroic opposition to feminised nature, which must be overcome by manly, 
abstract reason. In particular, matter is still pervasively portrayed as inert, passive 
and feminine, and thus as exploitable by the “higher” reality of abstract masculine 
reason – reason conceptualised from the start as domination and control over nature 
and everything feminine, including body and emotion. Irigaray’s narrative is thus to 
my mind better suited to explain how the devaluation of the material world serves 
to bolster relations of domination, than Nkrumah’s seemingly deterministic link 
between idealism and inequality on the one hand and materialism and equality on the 
other. In fact, without Irigaray’s added nuanced insights into the gendered dynamics 
14
Du Toit “When everything starts to flow”
of the hierarchical dichotomy, which could play out in different ways in different 
contexts of domination, it seems actually fairly easy to disprove Nkrumah’s basic 
claim: materialistic worldviews have not in fact invariably led to social equality, 
e.g. in certain hierarchical, even racist receptions of Darwinism, and it is on the 
other hand also true that sometimes supernatural worldviews support equality and 
emancipation, such as liberation theology. 
Irigaray’s work can thus be made fruitful in the context of colonial and post-
colonial Africa, especially if we ask, with Mbembe (2001), Thomas (2007) and Fanon 
(2001) about the dimensions of sexual subjugation and racist bodily objectification as 
key aspects of colonisation. Insight into how the Western sacrificial order works as a 
mechanism to stabilise master identities dissociated from concrete embodiment, can 
greatly enhance our insight into the psychological damage entailed by colonisation 
on the one hand, but also (more pertinent in our own time) help to illuminate to what 
extent post-colonial African societies perpetuate harmful sacrificial orders and thus 
repeat and perpetuate the logic of their own colonial trauma. 
These matters are of particular importance to the tradition of African feminist 
thinking, as Tamale (2008) shows so clearly in her writing on the supposed opposition 
between African culture and African women’s sexual rights. She shows that human 
rights instruments often perpetuate a colonial history of “Western imperialist 
caricatures of African sexuality” (Tamale 2008: 52) with “racist misreading[s] of 
African cultures such as polygyny, bridewealth and “widow inheritance” [which] 
reinforce…stereotypes of African women [and men]” (ibid: 53). At the same time, 
however, African women’s struggle to be co-interpreters of their own culture and to 
draw on the positive aspects of their cultures in working towards women’s sexual 
emancipation is often internally thwarted through the acceptance within post-colonial 
states of Judeo-Christian or Islamic laws and worldviews aimed at regulating and 
controlling women’s sexuality (ibid: 58). Here is then a clear instance of where an 
idealist or transcendent, supernatural worldview is used to create sexual hierarchies 
within society – precisely the kind of thing Nkrumah would oppose as a perversion 
and alien to Africa. 
Tamale (2008) shows how African feminists thus have to wage a struggle 
for emancipation on various fronts: against the often almost intractable coalition 
between African patriarchal interpreters of culture and globally dominant, often 
misogynist religious worldviews on the one hand, and against persistently derogatory 
interpretations of African sexuality by human rights groups (including some Western 
feminists) on the other. It is my contention that the combined insights of Irigaray and 
Nkrumah can substantially contribute especially to the struggle for emancipation 
of African women, caught as they are in a double-bind of misrecognition both by 
dominant patriarchal interpretations of African culture and of religion, and by neo-
colonial Western feminist and human rights discourses. Both these authors share 
a deep concern about emancipation – not just superficially in terms of normative 
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claims and structures, but also more deeply in terms of a reconceptualisation of the 
very nature of reality. This is necessary, both of them claim, because the structures 
of oppression are founded on a pernicious and sacrificial ontology and metaphysics. 
Nkrumah thus implicitly agrees with someone like Fanon (2001) who was concerned 
that mere political liberation was not enough for true African emancipation, for what 
is required is a thorough decolonisation of the mind and of African institutions. 
Irigaray is in a similar frame of mind when she returns again and again to the question 
of how to challenge, disrupt and re-imagine the currently dominant symbolic order. 
Tamale argues powerfully that African women should not and need not abandon 
their cultural traditions in their pursuit of sexual liberation. Instead, they should 
insist on the “full and equal participation of women in determining what [their 
culture] should be” (Tamale 2008: 58), in deciding on cultural meanings and their 
implications. In considering what African culture should be/come, the criticisms of 
Nkrumah and Irigaray on the Western paradigm and its oppressive effects, as well 
as their utopian sketches of possible alternatives, can potentially be of great help. It 
is therefore important for anti-colonial thinkers to get a better grasp of what Irigaray 
means when she describes the Western symbolic as a sacrificial order, and also how 
she envisions an alternative which shows some clear overlaps with Nkrumah’s 
consciencism. I will also show that Irigaray takes into account how asymmetrical 
power relations structure difference, and also that she avoids essentialist implications 
in her attempt to open up spaces for difference to be asserted. 
Drawing on the work of Girard (1977), Irigaray (1993a) describes the symbolic 
order of the West as a sacrificial order, thereby illuminating Nkrumah’s notion that 
the “dialectical contradiction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ ” as posited by Western 
idealism is a perverted form of thinking. On Caldwell’s reading of Irigaray, the 
sacrificial logic of Western philosophy and metaphysics “establishes limits and 
boundaries by demarcating sharply between inside and outside, [between] the 
material and the real” (Caldwell 2002: 26). Such limits and boundaries are necessary 
in order to establish personal or collective identity through the logic of sacrifice. 
Traditionally in the West, Irigaray argues, it is the maternal body and female sexual 
difference which have been sacrificed in order to erect the idealised and idealist 
masculine identity associated with the superior non-material sphere. This is why 
Irigaray wonders what a society would look like that did not exploit “the body-matter 
of women” (Irigaray 1985b: 85). Irigaray also, like Nkrumah, criticises the split and 
opposition which Western metaphysics forced between the mind and the material 
world. In becoming an idealised (strictly impossible, masculine) subject, all aspects 
of materiality, singularity and thus difference, interdependence and becoming, all 
needed to be split off from the self-understanding of the subject, and “reduced...to a 
static ground or constitutive outside on or against which concepts and subjectivity 
emerge” (Caldwell 2002: 18). The “self” of this economy or this logic needs a solid 
ground of “otherness” against which it can stabilise and erect its own identity. The 
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preferred solid ground in the case of Western metaphysics is the maternal body, 
associated with matter declared to be inert. 
Just as the self is stabilised against flux and otherness through the projection 
of the Other, concepts and intelligible ideas (Plato’s forms) are also stabilised by 
being shielded against time, difference, materiality, and the contingent, by placing 
them in absolute opposition to the “feminine sphere of materiality (understood as) 
inert matter, whose constitutive exclusion sustains the intelligible by...serving as 
the ground upon which the progression to the intelligible world occurs” (Caldwell 
2002: 18). Individual and collective identities in the sacrificial order thus reflect each 
other structurally, as the establishment and maintenance of all identities require an 
“other” onto which undesired aspects of worldly existence may be projected and 
then expelled from the self-understanding of the masculinised self or collective. 
Because stabilisation, grounding, is what is desired and fluidity is what is feared, 
Irigaray says “[m]etaphysics always supposes, in some manner, a solid crust from 
which to raise a construction...The metaphysical is written neither on/in water, nor 
on/in air, nor on/in fire. Its ek-sistence is founded on the solid” (Irigaray 1999: 2). 
Like Nkrumah, Irigaray is not satisfied with diagnosing the problem but suggests 
that part of resisting the dominant metaphysics could be to imagine how things could 
be otherwise. 
An alternative, fluid economy or ontology would first of all preserve the dynamic 
link and necessary interdependence, as well as the distinction or interval, between 
on the one hand material relationships whose terms can never be fully separated and 
the concepts, subjectivity and identities that these construct on the other (Caldwell 
2002: 24). Secondly, it would acknowledge on a conceptual as well as a material 
plane the necessary interdependence as well as the distinction and interval, between 
the masculine and the feminine, and between other forms of difference. Fluidity 
and interdependence also thirdly imply that such an economy will no longer invest 
in the possibility of arresting movement or meaning, and thus in the possibility that 
any identities, whether individual or collective, could be arrested and stabilised 
successfully over time through the sacrifice of alterity. This economy would in the 
fourth place not encourage or reward a flight from change and instability, and thus 
the fluidity and ambiguity within oneself, as well as multiplicity and change within 
the community, will be welcomed rather than feared and repressed. Such an economy 
will make it comfortable, dignified and human to live with the knowledge that, both 
individually, subjectively, and collectively, “form [is] no more than an apparent and 
temporary stability in the patterns of potentiality or flow” (Battersby 1998: 51). 
It is fitting that in Irigaray’s metaphorics, the forgotten passageway, the erasure 
of elements of lesser density, is also the way of literal birth, and the pathway of the 
monthly flow which links this passage to the metaphorics and economy of fluids, and 
thus to Thales’ favourite element. For Irigaray, then, the ancient Greek separation 
and gendered opposition between mind and matter, form and substance, still lies 
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at the heart of the sacrificial order that we live in today. She claims that we need to 
remember and recover “the forgotten passage way connecting the material and the 
intelligible”, since “concepts and subjectivity emerge within a dynamic interaction 
between the material and the intelligible, neither of which can be reduced to the 
other” (Caldwell 2002: 24). In the cave myth, the pathway that is travelled in order 
to move from the cave into the light, and thus the link between the feminine and 
masculine principles is gradually erased and finally denied. In other words, when 
the passageway is forgotten, then both the link and the inter-dependence, as well the 
interval, between feminised matter and masculinised intelligibility are forgotten and 
denied.
Like Nkrumah, Irigaray is concerned with facilitating a transition from a 
sacrificial order to something different and non-sacrificial, and like him she claims 
that in this transition, we need to substantially rethink the relation between matter 
and form. For Irigaray, as for Nkrumah, such a radically new understanding at the 
ontological level, aimed at repairing a fundamentally intact and integrated human 
world torn apart by a life-threatening metaphysics, needs to be named and for this 
she creates the neologism “sensible transcendental” understood as “participating in 
both the material and the ideal” and in the process “disarray[ing] the traditional 
oppositions between these domains” (Caldwell 2002: 24; Irigaray 1993b: 33). For 
Caldwell, this Irigarayan term refers to “a new symbolic economy shaped by a logic 
of fluids rather than solids” (Caldwell 2002: 25) and it “indicates that matter and 
form retain an irreducible relation characterised by an interval” (ibid: 25), with 
conceptual mediation remaining material and therefore necessarily disrupted by 
difference. This means that if conceptual mediation is simultaneously understood as 
material, it will not be seen to require “the exclusion of materiality and ambiguity” 
(ibid: 25), leading to a fluid economy of meaning.
Although Irigaray thus clearly, like Nkrumah, starts to conceptualise and 
imagine an alternative order to the currently dominant one, she does not fall prey 
to an essentialist or a-historical position and neither does she deny the influence 
of relations of domination on our current constellation of sexual difference. In 
fact, as Whitford (1991: 101ff) explains, for Irigaray, what poses as female sexual 
difference within the current mono-sexual symbolic order, is a distortion of actual 
sexual difference, and she would thus endorse Harding’s (1987) critique of feminine 
care ethics as an approach that fails to grasp sexual difference authentically. She 
calls the appearance of female difference within the sacrificial order “the feminine” 
or “the other of the same” where female sexual difference can only appear or be 
represented as the rejected and devalued “other” of the male norm of the human. 
Since the sacrificial order is established on the murder of the mother or the erasure of 
material sexual difference, we cannot really know what women could be or become 
if they were allowed to cultivate their differences within a symbolic order that did 
not sacrifice them. For this utopian category Irigaray coins the term “other of the 
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other”, i.e. those aspects or dimensions or manifestations of “the other sex” which 
are currently repressed and not allowed to appear within the sacrificial order (cf. 
Irigaray 1985a: 90; Whitford 1991: 104). This is how she manages to keep open the 
possibility or dream of female sexual difference, instead of reducing it to an effect 
of current relations of dominations, but also instead of giving an essentialist content 
to what that difference could or should entail. Precisely because the non-sacrificial 
order is seen as fluid while still allowing for form and identity to momentarily appear 
and take shape, sexual difference and identity are neither discarded altogether, nor 
pinned down in new definitions.
CONCLUSION
We should not be forced to choose between memory and hope. Perhaps there would 
be no more interest in emancipation, no more anticipation of freedom, if the Exodus 
and the Resurrection were effaced from the memory of mankind (Ricoeur 1981: 99-
100).
In this essay, “Hermeneutics and the critique of ideology” Ricoeur links 
hermeneutics, or “an ontology of prior understanding” to memory; and he links 
ideology critique, or “an eschatology of freedom” to hope, in an infinitely mutually 
implicated circle or spiral. The way in which we remember (or wish we could 
remember) the past, feeds into and shapes the future. Stories about a better past 
inspire hope for a better future. We have seen in this chapter that both Irigaray and 
Nkrumah believe in the indispensability of such stories. And both tell their alternative 
stories with an emancipatory intent. I would go so far as to claim that, because of 
the intertwined nature of ontology and power, worldview and ethics, emancipatory 
projects cannot do without such stories conjuring up other worlds. Thinking that we 
can afford to live, can survive, will retain hope without such stories in a crushingly 
racist and misogynist symbolic order, is an idle fantasy. African women must keep 
on telling such stories to inspire our daughters and ignite their imaginations for a 
better world. But for the sake of a fluid future and the recognition of the sacred 
within the tension-filled material world, and of the sacred feminine, we would do 
well to remind ourselves that they are and remain just that - stories floating on the 
stream of time.
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